Abstract: Since 1994, the World Bank has provided partial credit guarantees to private financiers of several large infrastructure projects in developing countries. A major objective of the partial guarantee program is to leverage Bank resources so as to provide developing countries with better private credit terms. A real test of the efficacy of World Bank partial credit guarantees is whether such guarantees also lower the interest rate and lengthen the effective maturity of the part of the credit not covered by the World Bank guarantee. On the basis of closed deals so far, this paper concludes that there is no evidence that guarantees have affected nonguaranteed interest rates favorably, while the duration of the nonguaranteed credits remains relatively low. 
Introduction
The World Bank has traditionally provided capital in the form of loans. The provision of loan guarantees by the World Bank for credits made by others, however, has always been a possibility. In July 1994, the World Bank's board (World Bank 1994a) accepted the idea of mainstreaming guarantees as an operational tool. Since then seven guarantees have been extended by the Bank. 1 The total debt covered was approximately $1 billion by September 1995 (World Bank 1995) . The relatively small volume of guarantee transactions may reflect the Bank staff's or borrowers' relative unfamiliarity with the loan guarantee instrument, and some caution as to their ultimate cost effectiveness and usefulness. 2 A relevant question is whether the deals closed so far meet the objectives set out for the loan guarantees program. Any look at these deals, of course, is provisional, as none of them has yet run its full course. Just from the contractual terms, however, we can already learn a few things. This paper specifically examines whether
World Bank guarantees improve the credit terms (in terms of interest rate and credit duration) pertinent to the nonguaranteed part of the overall financing; other possible indirect benefits of guarantees are not considered.
There are two types of World Bank guarantees (World Bank 1995); partial risk guarantees insure against a particular set of sovereign risks, and partial credit guarantees ensure the payment of specific credit installments. A partial risk guarantee, specifically, can insure against the sovereign risk that the government reneges on announced regulation related to the financed project. Alternatively, it can insure against the breach of contract by the government, say, to purchase part of the project's output. In case of a power plant, for instance, the government may have obligated itself to purchase electricity in a certain volume at a certain rate.
So far, the World Bank has provided partial risk guarantees in two cases (World Bank 1995) : for the Hub Power project (Pakistan 1995) , and for the Uch Power Project (Pakistan 1995) . For these transactions, it is difficult to assess whether these projects would have received the necessary finance without the partial risk guarantee and, if so, at what rates. At the same time, it may be difficult to determine whether the contractual risk premium overstates or understates the underlying risk. For these reasons, this paper does not examine in any way the contractual terms of the concluded partial risk guarantee deals.
Partial credit guarantees obligate the World Bank to make one or several interest or principal payments on the loan, in case of project default. In practice, the World Bank requires the country to provide a counter-guarantee, which requires the country to reimburse the World Bank in case the guarantee is exercised. In addition, the country may or may not also guarantee the payments to the private creditor not covered by the World Bank guarantee. Such an additional public guarantee is usually provided. Payments not covered by the World Bank guarantee thus in practice are sovereign debts, in addition to commercial debts. If the project is in the public sector and, perhaps, subject to soft budget constraints, then the nonguaranteed payments are purely sovereign debt. From the creditor's perspective, deals involving World Bank partial credit guarantees thus are hybrid instruments consisting of sovereign debt (payments excluded from the Bank guarantee), and Bank obligations (payments covered by the guarantee).
The hybrid nature of partial-credit-guarantee transactions makes it possible to 'decompose' or 'strip' these transactions, and to calculate credit terms separately for the two parts. The credit terms relate to the interest rate and the duration, which is a summary measure of the average maturity of the interest and principal payments due. Duration is a more comprehensive measure of the effective credit length than maturity, which is simply the number of periods till the final payment.
Stripping World Bank guarantee transactions -as to interest rates and duration -requires information on contractual interest rates and on exactly which payments are covered by the guarantee. After the stripping, one can compare the interest rate on the sovereign part of the transaction to other sovereign interest rates for the same country. This comparison informs us whether the World Bank's involvement provides synergies in also improving credit terms on the credit not covered by the World Bank guarantee. This paper presents calculations along these lines for five partial credit transactions concluded since May 1994. 3 The deals relate to a telecommunications project (Jordan 1995) and four power generation projects (Philippines 1994; and China 1994 and China , 1995 and China , and 1996 . The comparison with unrelated sovereign credits can only be completed for the four power generation projects. This reflects that in the Jordanian telecommunications case there were no public guarantees for payments excluded from the World Bank guarantee. 
2.

Objectives of World Bank loan guarantees
As direct loans, credit guarantees are instruments to promote economic development.
Guarantees are attractive and can be low-cost, if they 'leverage' Bank resources. Some of the more direct objectives served by credit guarantees are the following: 
Financial market development
A third broad objective is to provide countries with useful experience in dealing with international private capital providers. Such experience involves 'hands-on' experience in constructing credit transactions. Also, guarantee transactions enable a borrowing country to build a track record and reputation as a creditworthy borrower, leading to lower borrowing costs in subsequent transactions. Experience with international capital market transactions may further speed the development of purely domestic financial markets.
3.
Interest rate externalities flowing from World Bank guarantees
This section reviews several reasons why the joining of World Bank guaranteed and nonguaranteed credit may affect the interest rate pertaining to the nonguaranteed credit. The various possible interest rate externalities imply that the sum interest rate externality in principle can be of either sign. A look at the actual data thus is necessary to resolve whether the externality is favorable or unfavorable. A summing up of possible externalities follows.
The effects of Word Bank credit appraisal
In practice, the World Bank relies on prospective private creditors to do their own credit appraisal of a project. The World Bank also does a project appraisal, but probably a less thorough one than if it were the sole credit provider. 5 All the same, World Bank involvement in a project is probably taken as a signal of approval by private credit providers. 6 The participation by 5 the World Bank, therefore, should have a downward effect on required private interest rates.
World Bank involvement may carry special weight in countries where the Bank is known to have a knowledge advantage resulting from a long-standing credit relationship. A complicating factor, however, is that the World Bank, as a development bank, has far broader objectives than simply to ensure loan repayment. A World Bank guarantee therefore is a somewhat noisy signal of the Bank's faith in the commercial merits of the undertaking. Also, a problem is that credit appraisal is a public good. Co-financing and partial credit guarantees to some extent lead to fragmentation on the creditor side. With multiple creditors, each individual creditor has a smaller incentive to thoroughly evaluate a project. This pushes up required interest rates. A benefit of having multiple creditors, however, is that risk can be allocated more efficiently. World Bank guarantees, to the extent that they spread risk, should be expected to lead to lower credit terms.
The seniority of World Bank-guaranteed payments
Next, it is important to consider the relative seniority of guaranteed and nonguaranteed payments. The World Bank has a most preferred creditor status, which makes World Bank guaranteed payments more senior than the nonguaranteed payments. A World Bank guarantee pertaining to some payments thus makes the other, nonguaranteed payments less valuable -for a given repayment capacity. The earnings flowing from a particular project can indeed be taken to represent a given, fixed debt servicing capacity. The relative seniority of guaranteed and nonguaranteed payments thus is most relevant, if the project can be seen in isolation. The nonguaranteed payments, however, in practice are often covered by a sovereign guarantee and thus are sovereign debt. A country's overall debt servicing capacity is only slightly affected by the success or failure of a specific project. Thus the relative seniority of guaranteed and nonguaranteed payments flowing from a particular project may only slightly affect the value of the nonguaranteed debt.
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The acceleration of World Bank guaranteed payments
The interest rate on the nonguaranteed debt further depends on specific contractual features of the transaction. One such feature is whether or not the Bank guarantee is accelerable. 
4.
Calculating credit term externalities
This section 'strips' a group of five transactions involving World Bank partial credit guarantees to arrive at (I) the interest rate paid on the nonguaranteed part of the credit, and (II) the duration of the nonguaranteed credit. The stripping procedure is as follows. Let 0 be the period of initial disbursement, and n the final payment period. Let B t be the payment at time t covered by a World Bank partial credit guarantee. In the cases considered below, these guaranteed payments are all principal payments, but in general they can be interest payments as well. 8 As a first step, we calculate the present value as of period 0 of the stream of guaranteed payments B t . To arrive at an appropriate discount rate for these Bank-guaranteed payments, we consider the yields that the Word Bank pays at the time it has issued 5-year and 10-year dollar- , to the bank. In practice, these nonguaranteed payments include interest and principal payments; also the nonguaranteed payment is negative if a disbursement takes place that exceeds the interest repayment, as is the case at period 0. Next, we compute the implicit interest rate on the nonguaranteed credit. This interest rate is the interest rate that makes the present value of all nonguaranteed payments, C t , equal to (minus) the present value of the guaranteed payments, B t .
Note that the contractual interest rate (the coupon rate in case of a bond) is in-between the yield applied to World Bank guaranteed payments, and the implicit interest rate on nonguaranteed credit. For example, if the World Bank yield is lower than the coupon rate, then the implicit interest rate on nonguaranteed payments exceeds the coupon rate. We also wish to check whether the presence of the World Bank guarantee has stretched the available nonguaranteed credit. A useful summary measure of the average maturity of a stream of payments is the duration, defined as the weighted average of the time periods till individual payments are due, with the weights being the present value shares of the individual payments.
Formally, duration is given by:
where r t is the computed interest rate on the nonguaranteed credit. 9 Note that duration equals maturity n for a discount bond with a single payment due n periods from now, but it is less than n for any other financial instrument. Duration is a useful concept for a creditor in assessing repayment risk, as it indicates the average number of periods the creditor has to wait for the payments due. The concept of duration, as a index of maturity, makes it possible to compare the average maturity of two financial instruments with entirely different repayment profiles.
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In four out of the five cases below, the contractual interest rate is not fixed, but rather a flexible rate defined as a fixed spread above the 6-month LIBOR dollar rate. In these instances, 12 Bonds issued by the same borrower should be subject to roughly the same commercial risks. Let us assume the two National Power Corporation bonds in table 2 were issued at par. Then we see in the last row of the table that these bonds carry yields of 1.91 and 2.86 percent above the 10-year U.S. Treasury Source: see appendix for underlying data sources.
yield, respectively. These relatively low spreads above the U.S. Treasury yield suggest that the World Bank guarantee, in the case of the Leyte-Luzon project, has increased rather than reduced the nonguaranteed sovereign credit yield.
Finally, columns (3) -(5) in table 1 present data for the three Chinese power projects (Yangzhou, Zhejiang, and Ertan Hydroelectric II). In all three cases, the borrowers can draw dawn the committed loan amount over a three-year period. In the calculations, however, it is assumed that the entire loan amount is disbursed immediately at time 0. 13 The three transactions have similar repayment profiles, with semi-annual repayments starting after year five. The World Bank only guarantees some final principal payments. Note that the number of principal payments covered by the World Bank guarantee goes down from 10 to 9 to 7 for the three projects.
Contractual spreads (over LIBOR) also display a downward trend. Both trends suggest that, with time, private capital providers look more favorably on this type of deal. The present value of Bank-guaranteed principal payments ranges from 14.45 to 19.42 percent of the loan's face value, depending mostly on how many principal payments are Bank-guaranteed. Calculated nonguaranteed loan spreads above the 5-year swap interest rate are in all three cases between 0.5 and 1.0 percent. These estimates imply that the nonguaranteed spreads exceed the hybrid contractual spreads. This is consistent with the observation that the hybrid yields exceed the World Bank yield. The duration of nonguaranteed credits is around six years. Source: see appendix for underlying data sources.
Next, we compare the computed nonguaranteed spreads to spreads on other sovereign credits to China. There have in fact been many credits to the Chinese authorities directly, and to companies within China covered by public repayment guarantees. As a benchmark, the People's
Republic of China borrowed $ 3.7 billion from financial institutions in 1995 at a spread of 0.5 above LIBOR, with final repayment after 7 years. The best Chinese borrowers are directly stateowned banks or banks with strong ties to Beijing. The People's Construction Bank, for instance, has received several large credits in 1993 at a spread of 0.00 above LIBOR, and also the Bank of China tends to borrow at that rate. Commercial ventures in China that borrow with public guarantees tend to obtain spreads above LIBOR in the 0-2 percent range. Many commercial ventures that borrow with public guarantees thus pay higher spreads than the central government.
A possible reason for this is that public guarantees for commercial debts may not be fully credible. To limit the set of comparables, we focus on publicly guaranteed credits to utilities from international financial institutions in the period 199495. Contractual terms for four comparables are represented in table 3. 14 The major difference between the guarantee deals and the comparables is the credit amounts involved. 15 The spreads on the comparable loans are in the 0.5-1.1 percent range, which is very similar to the range of nonguaranteed spreads computed above. There is thus no evidence that World Bank guarantees have favorably influenced the nonguaranteed sovereign yields. Source: see appendix for underlying data sources.
The difference between the calculated interest rate on nonguaranteed credit and the yield on World Bank bonds reflects the riskiness of the nonguaranteed debt (relative to World Bank bonds). As such, this interest rate spread is an indicator of the value of the World Bank guarantee to the private creditor. 16 The interest rate calculations of this section thus can be a basis for calculating market-based guarantee premia for World Bank partial credit guarantees. 17 As an aside, the value of partial credit guarantees to a private creditor probably is far greater than the cost of this partial credit guarantee to the Bank. The reason is that coverage by a World Bank partial credit guarantee increases the value of the sovereign credit guarantee, simply because the country is more likely to make good on its counter-guarantee to the World Bank that it is on a public credit guarantee to the international private creditor. Essentially, the preferred creditor status of the World Bank enables it to 'make a profit' by selling partial credit guarantees for more than it charges the country. This reasoning, however, only applies to the deal under consideration. Specifically, this reasoning does not take into account that a World Bank partial credit guarantee can only make a credit more senior by making other credits more junior. These considerations become important if a sizable share of a country's credit is covered by World Bank guarantees.
Conclusion
This paper has examined whether World Bank partial guarantees also improve the credit terms related to the nonguaranteed part of the credit transaction. On the basis of existing cases, there is no evidence that World Bank partial credit guarantees have improved the associated nonguaranteed credit terms. Also, World Bank partial credit guarantees do not appear to increase the duration of the nonguaranteed financing. It should be noted that the analysis of this paper has been limited to only 5 concluded partial credit guarantee transactions. A clearer picture of the sign of the interest externality of World Bank guarantees can only emerge through the analysis of new cases. Strip analysis of guarantee transactions, however, can be done equally well before as after the deal is closed. By performing such analysis routinely, the World Bank can weed out deals that fail to generate favorable credit terms on the nonguaranteed credit. This paper recommends that interest and duration analysis along these lines is made a standard part of evaluating potential World Bank guarantee transactions.
